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DD/ST# 3445/68

NRO REVIEW COMPLETED

5 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT : Coordination of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Effort

REFERENCE : Memorandum to DD/S&T from D/DCI/NIPE,
Dated 27 August 1968, Subject: DCI Report
on the Community to the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (DD/S&T 3363/68)

1. The reference requested a DD/S&T submission to the Director's annual report to the PFIAB on "Coordination of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Effort" and suggested that responses be grouped under: a) Major coordination problems, b) Gaps, deficiencies, and undesirable duplication, and c) Recommended actions. This very broad topic was discussed by senior individuals on our staff, and the results of our quick worm's eye view are as given below. We were asked for an Office contribution by [] and have largely confined our comments to the analysis side of intelligence problems.

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2. Major problems existing in the coordination of the intelligence community. The major problem here is that Departmental policies affect both current intelligence and estimates. The recent and continuing battles over the mission of [] is symptomatic of this. While we could not reasonably expect policy to be divorced from intelligence, we feel that there is too much blind subservience to a policy by individuals at the working level in DOD, with the result that they are often neither free to compromise positions nor willing to advise their superiors to change a position, when new evidence makes it perfectly clear that these things should be done.


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3. Significant gaps, deficiencies and undesirable duplication of the various U.S. intelligence agencies. As gaps we would highlight: a) Poor inter-agency access to raw and partly processed data, b) Poor inter-agency dissemination of contractor finished reports, and c) Poor feedback of technical intelligence data to U.S. laboratories engaged in weapons and counter-weapon development programs. We feel the greatest deficiency remains the gross imbalance between the huge fund expenditures for intelligence collection and the trickle spent for analysis. People have been paying lip service to this for years but nothing is done about it. The real reason for this state of affairs seems to be that there has been constructed a budgetary machine which makes it relatively easy to get funds to purchase hardware but next to impossible to hire another analyst. 25X1



4. Specific actions to strengthen the effectiveness of the overall intelligence effort. In raw terms, whoever controls the money has the real power. If one applied this principle to the intelligence community, then it seems that the single action which would tidy things up would be to give the DCI the power to unilaterally veto expenditures for collection, processing, or analysis by any agency of the intelligence community, with appeal only to the President. 25X1



DAVID S. BRANDWEIN
Director
Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center

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6 SEP 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology
SUBJECT: DCI Report on the Community to PFIAB
REFERENCE: Copy of Memo for DD/S&T for D/DCI/NIPE,
Same Subject, dated 27 August 1968

Attached is the OSI contribution to the Director's annual report to PFIAB on "Coordination of the U. S. Foreign Intelligence Effort" as requested by John Bross. In addition to our comments in the attachment, which have been prepared in response to the headings specified in the reference, we believe that in coordinating intelligence activities concerned with the analysis and production of S&T intelligence in such areas as atomic energy, BW/CW, air and naval weapons systems, military electronics, life sciences, and others, JAEIC and SIC have been generally successful in insuring that all critical subjects are covered by member agencies and research is conducted by more than one agency only in certain cases where a broad attack on a problem/desirable or necessary.
is

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for DONALD F. CHAMBERLAIN
Director of Scientific Intelligence

Attachment:
As Stated

Distribution:
Copies 1 and 2 - Addressee
3 - DD/S&T Registry
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6 and 7 - Exec. Staff./SI

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
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I. MAJOR PROBLEMS

A. Compartmentation of information still leads to uneven access to data within the community and hinders all-source analysis, including some analyses performed by contractors.

B. Difficulties still exist in getting the managers of technical collection systems together with those who have the requirements for information in time to influence the design and operation of the systems, including the all-important data reduction phases. Some problems peculiar to SIGINT are touched on further in paragraphs D and E, below.

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E. A problem has existed in the past in creating an appropriate dialogue between the elements responsible for development of collection systems and those responsible for establishment of intelligence requirements. This problem is especially critical when very expensive systems are involved. It is most desirable to obtain an assessment of the intelligence values involved in system design trade-offs that appear because of technical limitations or because of cost factors. This past year the SORS and the NRO have initiated such a dialogue, and two studies which subsequently received USIB approval were transmitted to the NRO.

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A continuation and expansion of this relationship between the elements establishing intelligence requirements and those developing and operating collection systems promises to improve the responsiveness of collection systems to intelligence needs. This SORS action in this case might also be used as an example under Item III "Specifications to Strengthen the effectiveness of the over-all intelligence effort" in that it sets useful precedent for other fields.

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II. SIGNIFICANT GAPS, DEFICIENCIES AND UNDESIRABLE DUPLICATION OF THE VARIOUS U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

A. The S&T intelligence problems are becoming increasingly complex and require more elaborate analytical efforts to derive conclusions that will bear the scrutiny of increasingly concerned and perceptive consumers. Yet, it is still true that the bulk of the U.S. intelligence dollars go into elaborate collection schemes while the amount allocated to new analytical resources, not merely to data reduction facilities, continues to decline. The propriety of perpetuating this pattern in the face of no foreseeable reduction in the demand for finished intelligence should be examined. The collection of vast quantities of raw data that cannot be converted in timely fashion to finished intelligence appears to be a wasteful principle at best.

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C. The time required to process information at NSA and NPIC is still a problem of major concern to us. The perennial question of how much collation these two first echelon processors should attempt before release of data to the intelligence analysis community needs to be considered again. In some fields of advanced weapons intelligence we are still presented with year-old information despite persistent prodding.

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TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
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ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Regarding your note of 3 September attached, OSP has no additional information for DCI's Annual Report to the PFIAB. As indicated to you previously, our efforts in this regard are reflected in D/NRO's Report to the President's Board.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
EO/OSP 6B 00	3 Sept. 68



Office of the DD/S&T

TO: D/OSP

SUBJECT: Additional Information for
PFIAB

REMARKS:

Attached is a memorandum from John Bross to the DDS&T asking for additional information for the PFIAB on the subject of "coordination of the U. S. foreign intelligence effort."

The memorandum indicates that the contribution does not have to be extensive, but we would appreciate any comments you may wish to submit by c.o.b. Thursday, 5 September.



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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] brought this in around 1345; he said if you don't get anything out of it or if you want to discuss it, please call him on the green phone. He definitely wants back the info you sent him (with priority sticker on it).

If you like any of the attached inputs, he can take them back and paraphrase them. Understood him to say the attached were submitted by [REDACTED]

j

6 Sept 68

(DATE)

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ORD 5737-68

4 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR : All Division Chiefs

SUBJECT : Statement for the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

1. Admiral Taylor has asked that the DD/S&T comment on the area of "coordination of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence effort". I would appreciate a short statement if you feel that you wish to make a comment because of problems that you have run into in the past. The statement can be in rough draft form and should be candid and terse. No more than a paragraph is needed.

2. Three items of interest to which we should respond are:

a. Major problems existing in the coordination of the intelligence community; *atrocious from a security viewpoint.* 25X1

b. Significant gaps, deficiencies and undesirable duplication of the various U.S. intelligence agencies; *missions/jurisdictions delay and strangle needed effort*

c. Specific actions to strengthen the effectiveness of the over-all intelligence effort. - *return CIA to its named rôle - Central I A; info should flow-in from*

3. If you wish to comment because of problems that you have encountered in the past, I would appreciate receiving your short note by COB today. If you have any other questions on the matter, don't hesitate to give me a call.

all sources, info should flow out only in intelligence reports. I think that we have forfeited our responsibility

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EO/ORD

in the muchly overdone coordination bit, I also believe that our business is too open - see today's Post on RIV's, for example. g

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